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Most major stakeholders in Jordan are of the view that irrigated agriculture in the highlands 
in not sustainable. What is less well known is how the highland agriculture is intertwined 
with the nature of the Jordanian state and its territorializing impulses. We argue that 
Jordanian state’s placation of the elites by condoning their illegal water extraction and use 
practices, is an enterprise in hydro-social territorialization in a topographical register. But 
territory is not just topography, and the vast assemblages of human and non-human actors, 
e.g., international donors, markets, urban water users, along with water and energy 
infrastructure, also spawn a topological territory, where networks of power bridge the gaps 
between here and there, and make distant relationships, beyond the presumed sovereign 
boundaries, urgently present in local waterscapes. The topological register of Jordanian 
territorialisation through water, is quite resentfully experienced and noted by the smaller 
Jordanian farmers. The regional geopolitics and state’s territorial impulses intersect with 
water and land use practices to produce the deeply fissured politics of, and through water in 
Jordan.  
 





Land is power and struggles over land, power struggles. But land cannot be created (Elden 
2010: 806). However, land, as a productive resource and something worth fighting over, can 
be created—through water. While the techniques of surveying and cartographic 
representation may be paramount in the symbolic production of land in a territorial register 
(e.g., Schnell and Leuenberger 2014), it is water, especially in the arid realm, that is the key 
material building block of land with a strategic, political, economic and military valence—or 
territory (Elden 2010, Swyngedowu 2004). Highland agriculture and concomitant water 
development in Jordan, has been the bête noir of international donor agencies, and some 
Jordanian water managers contemporaneously (Bonn 2013). The unsustainable 
groundwater pumping involved, and the trade-offs with supplying water to burgeoning 
urban populations of Jordan have put the question of water development in the highlands 
of Jordan, at the centre of water policy debates in the country (Hagan 2008, Humpal et al. 
2012). We argue that highland water development, initially by the Jordanian state, and 
subsequently by private small and large agricultural interests, is an instance of hydro-social 
territorialization by the Jordanian state (also see Rodriguez-de-Francisco and Boelens 2016, 
Boelens et al. 2016, Hoogesteger et al. 2016). But this territorialization is riven by internal 
contradictions across spatial scales, between long term sustainability, neo-liberal 
development, geopolitics of water and urban proletarian versus rural elite placation within 
the Jordanian polity. We draw upon the results of a series of interviews [with the help of 
translators] and observations conducted with small and large farmers (twenty two in all), as 
well as water managers in Jordan (eleven main interviews and multiple joint meetings), to 
trace the contours of the hydro-social territory and territorialization, in supposedly one of 
the most geopolitically sensitive, and water scarce, countries in the world. 
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The term hydro-social points to human and hence political mediations in hydrological 
processes. It calls for a move away from a strictly biophysical understanding of the 
hydrological cycle and instead historicises the very formulation of the physical model (Linton 
2008). The approach puts a premium upon discourse, culture, politics and the socially 
inflected materiality of water as arbiters of water geographies. Jordan is an artificial post-
colonial state in a region of artificial post-colonial states. The imperatives of territorializing, 
within colonially drawn international boundaries are quite pressing for the country. We 
argue that water development for mostly commercial farming in the highlands of Jordan, 
was an important part of a territorializing drive by the Jordanian state. Water as an 
instrument of territorializing Badia, the arid highlands in the eastern part of the country, 
mirrored the neighbouring Israeli efforts at doing the same in the Negev desert (Morag 
2001, Harris and Alatout 2010) and over the rest of Israel (Yiftachel 2002, Mustafa et al. 
2016). The project, however ran into the political reality of water demand by a largely 
urbanized population and the physical limitations of groundwater availability in the 
highlands, on the one hand, and the state’s now entrenched commitment to neo-liberal 
development, and elite-placation as a mode of ensuring legitimacy, on the other. How 
Jordan negotiates the conflicting spatial demands and scalar politics of hydro-social 
territorialization is our key question. But before we turn to that, we undertake a brief 
literature review around concepts, which inform our analysis, namely the hydrosocial cycle, 
territorialization, scale and Jordanian state formation. 
 
 
FROM TECHNO-NATURES TO HYDRO-TERRITORIALIZATION 
 
Water resources geography has charted a number of new directions since its early 
pragmatist concern with expanding the practical range of choice in water management to 
democratic and scientifically informed decision making, and conflict resolution (White 1968, 
1973, Wescoat 1991). Starting in the 1990s, in a context of post-cold war neo-liberal 
triumphalism, the privatization of municipal water supply systems became the focus of 
Marxist and political ecology-inspired critical literatures (e.g., see Swyngedouw 1997, Bakker 
2005, Mustafa and Reeder 2008). Swyngedouw (1999, 2007), however, considered 
agricultural water, in the context of twentieth century Spanish water landscapes or 
‘waterscapes’. This work analysed the production of techno-natures during early twentieth 
century modernization and then negotiated the later scalar politics of national integration 
and Spain’s geopolitical alignment (with the anti-communist Western alliance) during the 
cold war. Swyngedouw’s reflections on techno-nature combined insights from Actor 
Network Theory (ANT) (Latour 1992, 2005) and Marxist and socio-nature inspired political 
ecology (Castree and Braun 2001). His work resonated with local level analyses of 
differential access to groundwater (e.g. see Birkenholtz 2009a & b, Sultana 2013) and urban 
water supply (e.g. Loftus 2007). Swyngedouw used the concept of ‘waterscapes’ to 
apprehend the interactions between water, power and socio-political dynamics and, 
building from this, we develop the term for the Jordanian context (Menga and Swyngedouw 
2018). However, others espousing a purer political economic analyses have focused on 
social power relations (in a more clearly structuralist tradition) to investigate differential 
access to water, again mostly at the regional and local scale irrigation systems, (e.g., see 
Mustafa 2002, Budds 2004). In both the theoretically hybrid techno-nature focused 
literature and social power oriented analyses, the question of scale remains live, understood 
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to be produced and reproduced through international development discourses, geopolitics, 
national policies and local practices. 
 
Without rehearsing the scalar debates, of which there are plenty (e.g., Marston et al. 2005, 
Collinge 2006), we maintain that scale is not an ontological given, but is instead produced 
through socio-spatial practices, discursive constructs and power struggles over meanings 
and material configurations that are perpetually emergent from the same. The concept of 
the hydro-social cycle radically destabilized the orthodoxy of the hydrological cycle; it is also 
an enterprise in understanding how cross-scalar socio-spatial processes materially refract 
and transform the simple global scale hydrological cycle to the extent that it has little 
meaning outside a hydrology text book (Linton 2010, Linton and Budds 2014). The hydro-
social, insofar as it refers to the imbrication of the social in the physical hydrological is 
predicated upon traversing the modernist social/nature divide; beyond that, it opens 
avenues for exploring the universe of the social as it interpellates and animates the 
hydrological. Nation building, and its concomitant territorializations, is one such social 
practice and discourse that is deeply relevant to the story of water in Jordan. It is to the 
territorial aspect of that story that we turn. 
 
Elden (2010a: 810) discusses territory as a political technology. As a mode of socio-spatial 
organisation it is geographically and historically limited (to a Western modernity) and is 
distinct from the universal imperatives of animal biology or human social life associated 
with territoriality. Elden’s (2010a) territory is understood in political economic and strategic 
registers—respectively land and terrain—but is associated, moreover, with technical 
development/advances (e.g. of scientific topography) and the operation of law. This 
recognition diverts attention from abstract and nomothetic approaches, perhaps along the 
lines of the ‘containers’ discussed by Peter Taylor (1994), to emphasise territory’s 
configurations in the local and the material, as the product of relational networks rather 
than an outcome in absolute, Euclidean space (e.g. Harvey 2006: 135). And if we disregard 
territory as simply a thing, then Joe Painter (2010) considers territory as a ‘phenomenon’, to 
recognise a ‘territory-effect’ as the product of networked socio-technical practices. 
Therefore territory, is empirically not only a topographical object or a bounded thing-in-
space: it has important topological dimensions (Allen 2016). As such, these dimensions are 
added to the strategic property relations, the technical and jurisdictional capacities that 
Elden (2010a) has identified. Furthermore, we note that it is often only through water that 
an associated mode of governmentality may be made to inhere for (dry) land. 
 
On this view territory is topographical only to the extent that analysis removes it from 
geographical and historical contexts. Like Elden (2010b; 2011), we are critical of views which 
posit territory as only bounded and therefore only topographical (e.g. Allen 2011) and so our 
account of hydro-territorialization in Jordan proceeds on the basis that the reproduction of 
state territory is a process to implicate a range of actors and processes extending well 
beyond the Jordanian state’s geobody. Territory, we feel, may appear in bounded forms, 
but this a mutable manifestation of strategic, political-economic, legal and technical 
relations, and an outcome of historically and geographically contingent dynamics. As the 
latter develop and modulate, we suggest, so may the hegemonic form of state 
territory/territorialization. We support this contention empirically by suggesting that two 
contradictory forms of territorialisation are apparent in the case of Jordan where, in 
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addition, affective relations are also drawn into overlapping, contradictory territorial 
processes. Here, we follow Boelens et al. (2016: 3) whose recognition of a 
phenomenological dimension suggests that the production of territory cannot rest in the 
formal processes of statehood or development but, rather, extends across scales to the 
biospheric inscription of human life worlds and affective experiences. 
 
Dimensions of territory relevant to water in Jordan may now be identified. Not least among 
them is the territory-effect of the socio-technical practices which surround water’s socially-
inflected materiality, and which identify territory as it happens in Jordanian waterscapes. 
Socio-technical activity implies organisational ‘disposition’ and accompanies the activities 
and politics of infrastructure spaces where the interests of ‘constellations of international, 
intergovernmental, and nongovernmental players’ (Easterling 2016: 15, 21) collide and 
domestic and transnational jurisdictions overlap. The state’s institutional authority, then, is 
met with competing sources of power and territorialising agency. We therefore recognise 
the waterscape’s territorial relations in terms of interconnectedness exceed simply the 
cartographic or strategic calculations of terrain, or the property rights of land associated 
with the state (Elden 2010a). Certainly, these are important, but the networked, topological 
relations produced between and among thirsty people and crops, their deep-water wells, 
water tankers, suction pumps, boreholes and standpipes (Mustafa and Talozi 2018) are not 
simply commensurable with the formation of land and terrain, but bound directly to the 
historic, ongoing and cross-scalar production of Jordanian territory. 
 
Indeed, state power and irrigation systems (for example) have existed in dialectical relation 
(Wittfogel 1957), each becoming as power is territorialised and reterritorialized at different 
scales over time. Equally, within quotidian territorial imaginations water plays an important 
role as a pivot, mediating and reproducing the state’s territorial power. And although water 
governance is usually vested at the national/state level, the accumulation and circulation of 
capital reproduces space to the detriment of existing scales of governance, whether 
national or local (Rodríguez-de-Francisco and Boelens 2016: 143, Harris and Alatout 2010). 
In other words, water and the technologies of its consumption/circulation order 
disposition(s) of authority within the Jordanian waterscape as it is continually reconfigured. 
We can therefore follow Jeffrey (2013) to understand the state as a form of continual 
improvisation by multiple actors. As Jason Dittmer (2014: 393) recognises, they ‘huddle 
around [an] attractor in topological space’, where an ‘assemblage’, whether a state-
territorial formation or a waterscape, or indeed their intersection, is actualized in place and 
time. In this sense our attention turns to the topological relations produced among water 
infrastructures, by movements of commercial goods, and by people’s spatial experiences, 
and so by no means is our discussion of Jordan’s hydro-territorialisation limited to the 
topographical.  
 
Although recent discussions have turned to ‘hydrosocial territories’ we can only consider 
the latter as a topographical container if viewed in the narrowest sense. Recent literatures 
on the ‘hydrosocial cycle’ (Linton and Budds 2014) have reinterpreted water-society 
relations in terms of dialectical interrelationships and hybridity, and here we follow a 
general concern for ‘multiscalar [networks of] . . . humans, water flows, ecological relations, 
hydraulic infrastructure, financial means, legal-administrative arrangements and cultural 
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institutions and practices’ (Boelens et al 2016: 2). In this way, to revert to Elden (2010a), 
hydrosocial territory may now be applied to dimensions of territory beyond   
land and terrain. Whether imagined or materialised, the territory-effects of a diffuse, hybrid 
hydrosocial world are pronounced: hydrosocial territory represents a technology to 
include/exclude, discipline and marginalise. And so, to emphasise, territory is not simply the 
backdrop to struggles over absolute space but social substance in itself (Baletti 2012); it is 
vividly revealed in human activity in its political, cultural, material and societal registers to 
which we add ecological interactions. Hydro-social territory underscores the impossibility of 
any anthropocentric separation with nature and emphasises a place for the material and 
ecological in the drive to produce hydrosocial worlds according to various perspectives 
(Boelens 2015). Fundamentally, however, our concerns are directed towards the deeply 
politicised power relations that spawn geographies of highland agriculture in Jordan. 
 
With regard to Jordan specifically, Yorke (2013) as well as Hussein (2018a) document the 
intertwining of water management with the imperatives of a patrimonial, patronage based, 
shadow state. Yorke (2013) particularly traces the history of Jordanian state formation and 
documents how the Hashemite monarchy managed to retain its centralized power by 
making water and land, amongst other resources, central to the state’s patronage of 
powerful tribal and commercial interests, to buy their loyalties. Keulertz (2013) further 
analyses the shadow state’s forays into land acquisition in Sudan to secure strategic food 
security, and virtual water imports into the country. Mustafa et al. (2016) argue that even 
with donor driven reforms like water user associations (WUAs) in the Jordan valley, elite 
takeover is more the norm than exception. Despite their failure to become genuine forums 
for participatory water management, WUAs in Jordan valley are nevertheless preferred by 
small farmers as a conduit for access to the state and patronage networks. A main insight 
from the literature on Jordan is that water management is not just politicised but, rather, is 
one of the main currencies of the country’s politics (Yorke 2013).  
 
We will argue that the impulse for patronage-based water management and allocation in 
Jordan has driven a topographical territorialisation of the Jordanian state. But, subsequently 
in a neo-liberal era characterised by the increasing political power of urban centres like 
Amman, contradictions have emerged: elite-centred water allocations in the rural highlands 
are increasingly difficult to reconcile with the water demands of a growing urban 
proletariat. The interrelated elite-proletarian water demands reveal a spatial relation 
between cities and highlands and within the highlands, but also suggest that Jordan’s 
territorialisation now proceeds in a topological register, beyond the body of the state itself, 
characterised by flows of migrants to the cities and the export commodities leaving the 
highlands’ commercial farms. To analyse Jordan’s contemporary state territorialisation in 
terms of topography, we feel, is to prioritise a spatial hermeneutic which occludes the 
reterritorializing impulses of globalization and regional market integration. The story we tell 
here is of the irresolvable tension between these two territorializing impulses. As Allen 
(2011: 291) reminds us: 
 
In a topological ‘take’ on the reworking of state spatialities, what comes to the fore is 
less the extension of power ‘upwards’, ‘downwards’ or ‘sideways’ and rather more of 
an interplay between all the different institutional interests and authorities involved 
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where agendas are mediated for specific political ends through a mix of distanciated 
and proximate actors.  
The topological conceptualization therefore incorporates actors such as international 
donors, agri-business and the Jordanian security state whose power-laden negotiations 
deeply destabilize topographical spatial geometries (Allen 2011). Not coincidentally, such 
spatial instability also maps onto the fluid materiality of water and its flows across Jordanian 
waterscapes. Our argument also leads to consideration of a fluid topological 
reterritorialization of the Jordanian waterscape through cross-scalar processes that are 
circumscribed when analysis is limited by its focus on the topography of the Jordanian state. 
 
The research presented in this manuscript is based upon 14 interviews conducted with high-
ranking officials, policy makers and consultants in Amman. In addition 21 detailed 
interviews were conducted in the field with large, medium and small farmers in the 
northern governorates, Azraq Oasis, and in the Zarqa river basin. The interviews lasted from 
30 minutes to 2 hours and were supplemented with visits of the agricultural farms and 
detailed field observations. The primary research was supplemented with extensive review 
of the prolific grey literature on the water sector in Jordan, along with the more limited 
refereed published literature. The narrative offered below interprets qualitative interview 
data to illustrate the contours of power relations as they are actuated in the topological 
spaces of hydro-territorialization in Jordan. 
 
MODERNIST VISIONS AND ELITE PLACATION IN HIGHLAND AGRICULTURE 
 
In Jordan rain fed agriculture has been practiced since pre-history. A form of agro-
pastoralism has characterised agriculture within a narrow belt placed on a north-south axis 
penetrated by the winter Mediterranean precipitation. Further east lie the Syrian desert (in 
the north) and the northern edge of the Arabian desert (in the south of the country). This 
highland region (Badia) constitutes 85% of the land area of Jordan (Figure 1). The British 
colonial authorities had formed the vassal Emirate of Transjordan under the rule of 
Abdullah, of the Hashemite clan. British military and financial patronage of the ruling family 
continued after independence in 1946: they continued to provide financial resources for the 
relatively poor state to buy off the loyalties of the local tribal leaders, to establish the 
legitimacy of the Hashemites and to ensure political stability. In 1948 and again in 1967 
occurred massive influxes of Palestinian refugees which led to the near doubling of Jordan’s 
population. In the late 1960s the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) came virtually to 
be a parallel state within Jordan. In the aftermath of the civil war of 1970, with thousands of 
casualties, the PLO was expelled and something of a truce was called between the Jordanian 
population of Palestinian descent, from the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the local 
population from the East Bank of the river. Today, the Palestinian-Jordanian population 
dominates the economy and the commercial sector of the country while the East Bank 




Figure 1: Main water related pipelines and infrastructure in Jordan. 
 
The story of water, agriculture and state formation must be understood in light of the 
historical-geographical, geopolitical and resultant demographic forces that the country was 
subjected to from its inception. Additional influxes of refugees from Iraq and Syria (since 
2003 and 2010 respectively) has driven up Jordan’s population by an additional 14% (Ghazal 
2016). These demographic shocks driven by regional geopolitics are compounded by the 
fact that most of its territory is a semi-arid steppe region, underlain by an aquifer which is 
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steadily being depleted because of rampant groundwater pumping; in part of the Badia 
groundwater is going down by almost a metre annually (Humpal et al. 2012). In the frequent 
estimation of Jordanian water managers and policy makers, the demographic shocks 
following from instability in Jordan’s neighbourhood represent the key impediment to 
rational water management. This has reproduced their focus on water supply enhancement 
strategies: 
 
But a key constraint is political instability in the region and how it impacts us. We 
simply cannot plan in the context of high political uncertainty in the region, because 
of population spurts we get from refugee populations, e.g., in 1948 and then in 1967, 
when we got another 320,000 Palestinian refugees. We got refugees from the civil 
war in Lebanon, 750,000 Iraqis from the Gulf—many of whom have returned but still 
many are still here, and then finally the Syrian crises has increased our population by 
10%. How can you possibly do any long range planning in this context? (A senior 
water policy expert, 18/11/2013). 
 
Within this context, the earlier Jordanian state’s efforts at settling down the Bedouin 
population and awarding them free land and water rights represented an attempt at state 
territorialisation within a classic agrarian register. This was confirmed by many of our 
interviewees at the policy level and, in fact, in some instances the interviewees deemed 
government support for agriculture as one of the core functions of state for ensuring food 
security: 
 
This country does have an idealized view of agriculture where they, imitating the 
Israelis, wanted to settle down the nomadic population to build a nation (An 
expatriate water expert, 17/11/2013). 
 
Ninety percent of the practicing farmers are the ones who settled down from being 
Bedouin, but they also run their farms to sustain their animals (Members of the 
Jordan Olive Products Exports Association (JOPEA), 17/07/2016). 
 
Food security is a major concern for us. Just as the American subsidize their farmers 
we have to subsidize ours . . . Yes, domestic water supply is non-negotiable, but 
agriculture and food security is also important. Most importantly we want to 
preserve a pattern of living [agricultural] and cannot destroy it overnight (A high 
ranking Ministry of Water and Irrigation official 14/11/2013).  
 
These quotes speak of a topographic state imaginary. We return to this point directly, but 
first it is worth noting that they also suggest Jordanian territory’s dimensions as a political 
technology. As land, property relations are established through occupation; agricultural 
practices are among those which tied the state directly to its intended territorial extent 
(Elden 2010a: 805). Jordan had to be permanently occupied by the sons of the soil, to 
reproduce it as Jordanian; farming and water consumption cemented the intended political-
economic or property relations. Elden (2010a: 209) identifies a number of techniques, 
geographically and historically contextualized, which are concomitant with the production 
of territory: analytic geometry, associated developments in cartography, surveying, and 
maritime navigation and to these we would now add, in the Jordanian context, the 
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techniques of highland agriculture which, in the mid-20th century, supported settled 
agricultural populations and the domestic water supplies upon which they relied. 
 
Elden’s (2010a: 806) etymological work identifies ‘terrain’ to denote lands separated from 
the municipal authorities or ecclesiastical estates which owned them, as perhaps 
agricultural colonies. Those lands became the objects of ‘security, management and 
administration’ (Elden 2010a: 806). Here, for Jordan, we recall Soja’s (1989: 54-55, 166) 
description of agrarian regions’ relation to urbanization. We do not want to exaggerate the 
notion of the agrarian ‘colony’ too far in the case of Jordan (the post-colony) but 
nonetheless the country’s demographic transformations (amidst broader processes of 
uneven capitalist development) has implied an urban dependency upon the rural for food, 
labour, markets and above all water. Moreover, the interrelation of Jordan’s cities and 
highlands crystallises around competing elite-proletarian (urban and rural) water demands 
and, as we have suggested is at the root of contradictory territorialising impulses in Jordan. 
Therefore, the strategic relations of terrain, which characterises the state’s relationship with 
agricultural areas beyond the city (and the direct control of municipal authorities) would 
seem to be apparent in contemporary Jordan. 
 
These remarks, we suggest, underscore the specificity and the unfolding of Jordanian 
territory—a Jordanian territory-process—after the mid-20th century. But we must return 
briefly to a topographical state imaginary. Perhaps this is most obviously evident in Jordan’s 
international boundaries with its four neighbouring states. In this sense, law—specifically 
the international law of title to territory and boundaries—represents a further source of 
territory, particularly visible in strategic calculations (Elden 2010a: 810). National law, too, 
was a vital territorial source: Jordan’s Central Water Authority (CWA) was established on a 
legal basis.1 This is a powerful source of a topographical imaginary directed towards the 
production of a bounded territory within international borders.  
 
Questions of ‘here’ and ‘there’, as well as of powers ‘absent’ and ‘present’, have crumpled 
the neat Euclidean spatial imaginaries of the state (Allen 2011). In 1951 the UN Relief and 
Works Agency ‘established an Azraq Pilot Scheme, to investigate the possibility of 
developing agricultural resources for the settlement of refugees.’ A well was then dug ‘near 
Druze Village, and two refugee families were settled’ but the project was abandoned in 
1952. A Jordan-United States Joint Fund for Special Economic Assistance authorised 
investigation of land and water resources near Azraq in 1955 and the work—the Princess 
Alia Project—was carried out by engineers from Pennsylvania and Illinois.2 This work was 
reviewed by the British in the Azraq Groundwater Project report on the groundwater 
potential of aquifers. British, American and German donors were involved in decisions over 
financing infrastructure (for example to convey spring water from Azraq to Irbid in 1963 and 
                                                     
1 Article 3 of the Law of the Central Water Authority (1960) reads: ‘An Authority, called the Central Water 
Authority, shall be and hereby is created for the purpose of investigating, planning, establishing, promoting, 
implementing, constructing and to the extent necessary, managing and operating a comprehensive 
programme for development, conservation, protection,  and control of the water resources of the Kingdom of 
Jordan for maximum feasible use for domestic, municipal, livestock, industrial, irrigation, hydro-electric power 
and other beneficial purposes.’ See Department of Technical Co-operation, ‘Reconnaissance in Jordan, 26 
October – 6 November, 1963’, in: Central Water Authority, Jordan, National Archives (hereafter NA), Kew, file 
FO 957/262. 
2 Published Report on the Azraq Groundwater Project (1965), NA, FT 10/16, 45. 
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then Amman in 1980) and relating to technical assistance and funding energy infrastructure 
to power the pumps. Apparently centralized state activity may reinforce topographical 
assumptions but a history of international interventions in the Jordanian waterscape has 
involved flows of capital, knowledge and (expert) human bodies across Jordan’s 
international boundaries: the Jordan waterscape is a manifestation of global flows and 
power relations.  
 
Nonetheless, an otherwise extremely topographic imaginary highlights a fundamental 
contradiction of Jordanian water management: with a sprawling and continually expanding 
metropolitan region (Amman and other smaller cities like Irbid, Madaba and Ajloun which 
are each expanding and demanding greater water shares) water can only come from 
groundwater reserves of the ‘colonized’ highlands. Presently, this is a source exploited by  
highland agriculture. Current water transfers from the Disi well field (in southern Jordan) 
and the Jordan Valley’s King Abdullah Canal to Amman are enormously expensive. Long 
term, the only source can be a transfer from the agricultural sector (Figure 1). This 
contradiction—between late twentieth century attempts to make the desert bloom and the 
demands of a burgeoning urban population--were compounded in the 1990s by Jordan’s 
switch from a government-centred, developmentalist economy and agricultural sector 
towards a more neo-liberal economic model (Parker 2009, Potter et al. 2009): 
 
Making the desert bloom was our stipulated national policy through the 1970s-80s, 
but then the multi-national corporations (MNCs) started showing up here and made a 
mockery of the whole process. It is no longer about small farmers and livelihoods but 
about corporations, e.g., a couple of years ago some Spanish corporation showed up 
wanting to buy up 200,000 hectares to plant olives! (A senior water policy expert, 
18/11/2013). 
 
The classic, possibly romantic imaginary of a territorializing Jordan, spreading outwards to 
its boundaries through practices of settled farming has run up against images of more 
outward-looking economy. The latter is predicated upon the topological relations of an 
agricultural export economy, almost entirely dependent upon imported Egyptian and some 
Pakistani labour to grow high value crops (tomatoes, peaches, grapes, assorted vegetables 
and olives). Through this transition the Jordanian agricultural sector has been integrated 
into and made dependent upon markets in Europe and those, immediately adjacent, of Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia and Syria. This underscores a strategic relation of neoliberal territorialization: 
highland agriculture in Jordan has tied the production of state territory to the further 
production of global markets. Terrain, then, becomes relevant but not only for state actors. 
The historical trajectory of Jordan’s territorialization has reproduced class power and a 
mode of production dominant under Jordan’s neoliberal orientation. This has extended to 
the non-state agents of Jordanian territorialisation (e.g. large commercial farmers). The 
current closure of transit routes through Syria and Lebanon and the loss of markets like Iraq 
and Syria represent the major threats to commercial farmers in the highlands, as well as in 
the Jordan valley.  
 
One of the biggest problem lately is the loss of major markets, e.g., the Syrian, Iraqi 
and Eastern European market. The only market we have is the Gulf market. But there 
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is competition with the Egyptian and Iranian producers (An illegal large farmer, Azraq, 
21/07/2016). 
 
Jordan’s orientation towards global markets has challenged the state’s historical form of 
territorialisation based upon an imaginary of smaller farmers, producing for food security. 
The turn towards export-based farming has meant large farms are those best able to sustain 
market competition. 
 
Our property? You are talking 100 hectares. There is no one below 50 dunums3 in our 
area. Majority are big farmers, because you need good capital to start, and a large 
area. We are the oldest farmers here and the town was settled here in the 1970s to 
encourage Beduoin to settle down, and we have a Bedouin background (Large 
farmer, Hawran Plateau, 27/06/2016). 
 
While many large farmers, like the one above were settled by the state back in the 1970s, 
others are entrepreneurs who have simply appropriated the land and water in the highlands 
to initiate farming (Hussein 2018a). Since 1992 it has been declared illegal to undertake any 
further drilling in the highlands, but all the same, by some estimates thousands of new wells 
have been drilled, which paradoxically are also on the somewhat legally illegal spectrum 
(Humpal et al. 2012). Regardless, territory (land) is predicated on occupation by whatever 
means and territorialisation has proceeded in tandem with the development of agricultural 
technique: 
 
There is no real land settlement in our project area. It is a simple case of land 
grabbing in the region, where people just fence off land, drill illegal water pumps and 
start operating. Nobody can touch them, as in the example of this one farmer who 
was challenged by the water authority for his illegal pumping and he got permission 
from the King himself to keep doing what he had been doing. At the moment, there 
are about 600 wells in our project area [Mafraq] out of which only 10 or so are legal 
and the rest are illegal. You see it is legally not allowed since 1992 to drill wells for 
agricultural purposes, but thousands have been dug since, and then subsequently 
legalized. So those wells are illegally-legal—don’t ask me how (An expatriate water 
expert 17/11/2013). 
 
The urgency of the water crises, especially for urban water supply, where the threat of 
political unrest is a lot more urgent (by virtue of concentrated populations in physical 
proximation to the seat of government) than in the rural areas, cannot be over stressed. In 
that context, it is a remarkable act of political tightrope walking for the Jordanian state to 
simultaneously placate the large commercial farming elites, while risking the wrath of the 
urban proletariat in the long run. The urban elites do quite well with access to water at the 
expense of the poorer urbanites (Mustafa and Talozi 2018). This is even more surprising, 
when one considers that so rich and powerful are many of these farmers that agriculture is 
generally a very small part of their financial portfolio: 
 
                                                     
3 1 hectare = 10 dunums 
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Agriculture is less than 10% of my income portfolio. But in our case, you need 
something to be connected to the land itself. It wasn’t my choice, the land is not for 
me, it is for my entire family. It is definitely an identity issue (Large farmer, Mafraq, 
27/06/2016). 
 
In Jordan, part of the culture is also to have your own farm. To own a farm is not an 
investment for money [necessarily], but to complete your circle of prestige. For 
example, this doctor friend of ours, after retiring from his practice he bought 500 
dunums, but he planted only 200 dunums. He has a good house there with a 
swimming pool, and a BBQ on the side. He invites us and his friends to his farm to 
enjoy it and have fun (Members of the JOPEA, 17/07/2016). 
 
Seemingly, issues of prestige, identity, and links to the land drive many of the Jordanian 
elites to farming, at a cost of considerable social capital on their part, to fend off the state’s 
attempts at regulating or limiting them. Perhaps a historical imaginary of dispossession, on 
part of many farmers of Palestinian origins as well as the state’s own neurosis about land, 
territory and nationhood are not irrelevant to this seemingly economically and biophysically 
irrational behaviour. Moreover, we also recognise the production of territory (land), as it is 
tied to particular cliques within state agencies. During our interviews with a military 
personnel association a retired Brigadier said: 
 
In the Jordanian military, only the mukhabarat (military intelligence) is allowed to 
undertake farming as an economic enterprise. They run our farms in Baqura. They 
also started farms in Sudan, but that didn’t go very well. . . . For us Felaheen (peasant 
farmers) agriculture is what gives you dignity in your country, and gives you a sense 
that you belong to the country, that you are linked to its past and are a part of its 
future. It is not something that we just do for profit. It is a social heritage and it is 
what connects us to the country (28/07/2016). 
 
The above quote with its multiple registers of identity, national security and even deep state 
involvement in the agricultural sector should convey some sense of the depth of 
commitment that the Jordanian state and polity has to the status quo, of large farming in 
the highlands. That the agricultural settlements through the 20th century were a part of a 
larger nation-building project and sustaining a polity built upon patronage and elite capture 
of the state is clear, but we suggest that this is visible specifically in regard to territory. But 
under neo-liberalism coupled with further demographic shocks and increasing urbanization, 
the nature of that territorialization is not quite captured by the topographic sense of 
territorialisation where sovereignty involves the performances of bounded territories (Allen 
2011). Multi-national agri-business, large farmers exporting to international markets and 
overseas agricultural investments also point to how distanciated and proximate actors 
simultaneously are present and absent in terms of their power and influence in the 
Jordanian waterscapes. The reality of this topological ‘new’ territorialization is not lost upon 
the smaller and less powerful farmers in Jordan. It is to an account of their experiences, and 
even charges of deterritorialization levelled at the Jordanian state due to the power of 
export agriculture assemblages, that we now turn. 
 
OF SMALL FARMERS AND NEO-LIBERAL AGRICULTURE 
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The smaller farmers in the highlands, especially in the Mediterranean precipitation belt in 
western Badia are mindful of how their constrained access to water is an outcome of the 
Jordanian State’s trans-local commitments Their subjectivity informed by that realization is 
articulated in a couple of registers—of memorializing ecology, and of angst about 
reterritorialization of Jordan in a globalized register. Also, like most large farmers, some 
smaller farmers had also simply appropriated the land without following any legal or 
commercial process to gain a right to the land. 
 
I don't pay any land rent. The owners of this land don't know if they own this land. 
There are farmers who lease land through the ministry of Agriculture, like in the 
south. But that doesn't happen here, e.g., the Al Masri family who get land 
allocations. Here you just either lease the land, or buy it, or put hands on it and use it. 
I am trying to appropriate this land and I may or may not succeed in the long run 
(Small farmer, Azraq, 21/07/2016). 
 
There is a common impression in the highlands that if one develops land and maintains 
possession for 15 years, the land can be legally transferred. Evidently, this impression is 
based upon legal statutes in Jordan, e.g. Law 17, 1974—and we recall again the 
indispensability of the law to territory—but none allow for regularization of outright 
appropriation (Humpal et al. 2012). Among small farmers though, such outright 
appropriation is relatively uncommon. Nevertheless, the large farmers did appropriate the 
land outright for agriculture and installed some expensive irrigation infrastructure, 
indicating an intent to stay and defy the state. Even in the 1960s for example, exploratory 
reports specifically called for reserving the aquifier under Azraq as a reserve for municipal 
supply with agriculture strictly regulated. 
 
‘Aside from a few desert watering points, should they be required, drilling should be 
restricted to municipal supply wells constructed by the government. ‘In Area II, all 
drilling should also be controlled. Small areas may be irrigated from wells, to produce 
alfalfa or other crops that are relatively salt-tolerant and do not require a high level 
of land practice. The Wadi Herth and Wadi Medeisisat areas are particularly 
recommended.’ 
 
The reality today is quite different from what was envisioned then.4 
 
The ecological register was particularly prominent at the Azraq Oasis, which used to be a 
Ramsar convention wetland site. Water on the surface of this wetland had not been 
observed at the time of our visit since 1994. A heavy downpour in mid-April 2017, however, 
led to the filling up of the 73km2 Azraq Wetland Reserve site, after 23 years (Ramsar 2017). 
Since 1980 the oasis has been aggressively tapped for water for Amman. This was also the 
time when vegetable farming began in this region. The following extended interview quote 
from a native Druze resident of the Azraq town, outlines the changes he had experienced 
and knew about. 
 
                                                     
4 Azraq Groundwater Project report, NA, FT 10/16, 41. 
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In the past it was a desert with birds flying from the Northern hemisphere on their 
way to Africa. Water was abundant, the lake was large. There was a lot of grassland 
for horses and cows and Buffaloes. I was about 15 years old in the 50s. There were a 
lot of wild animals, e.g., deer. We used to hunt ducks, fouls, deer. The lake provided 
us our livelihoods. Every household used to have cows. We used to take the cows to 
the lakeside to graze and bring them back at night. In the 50s there was no 
agriculture. In the 50s there was no way to irrigate. Azraq was established as a trade 
centre where Bedoins would market their products. Druze came here in 1918 from 
Jebel Arab. South east of Azraq groundwater was 2 meters deep and it was saline. 
We would dig out the water and put them in mud evaporation ponds, during the day. 
In the evening the air would become cold and make crystals from the salt.  
 
Fruits and vegetables only arrived here in the 1960s. Before then anybody who went 
to Zarqa brought back fruits and vegetables if they could afford it. The economy here 
was on salts and water and wildlife were abundant. In the 1930s people started living 
out of the castle [that they lived in before] and started building their own houses. The 
first piped network was in 1964 to provide drinking water. Water was delivered from 
one water fountain per neighbourhood, and the women would collect water, from 
there. 
 
They first took water from Azraq for Irbid in the 1960s. And that was when the water 
declined for the first time. They did it till the mid-1970s. After that they started 
pumping to Amman. By the early 1980s and the people started selling their cows 
because there was not water and no grazing (Druze Farmer, Azraq, 21/07/2016). 
 
Indeed, in 1962 the Central Water Authority directed the construction of the Azraq-Irbid 
Pipeline scheme, the pumps and storage tanks it required. ‘A portion of the old Iraq 
Petroleum Co. pipeline was reclaimed, and partially re-laid, three high lift pumps were 
installed at Druze Village, taking water from the North Pool of the springs.’5 The Druze 
farmer’s somewhat nostalgic rendition of a time gone by, and the amenities of a wetland 
the native populations enjoyed, was also resonant with the loss of those in the process of 
change, instigated by far away metropolises of Irbid and Amman. But along with the partial 
domestic integration through the apparatus of pumping stations and pipes that transferred 
water from the wetlands to the cities, were also undertones of geopolitical changes in the 
region that also affected the Azraq Oasis, e.g., the mass migration of Palestinians into 
Jordan after the 1967 war, and their appropriation of land in the highlands. The historic and 
ongoing tensions with Israel and the ambivalent positionality of the Druze population of 
Azraq within that conflict, also featured in the conversations e.g., 
 
In 1968 the farms started to appear. Al Ausha was full of grasslands. In the 1970s 
investors especially Palestinians came and started establishing farms. The land was 
cheap, it was 5JD per Dunum. I sold a 41 dunum plot for 20 JD.  
 
                                                     
5 Azraq Groundwater Project report, NA, FT 10/16, 37.  
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The government looked favourably at agriculture, because it was improving the 
economy of the region. We even got a salt factory in 1986. They established a 
cooperative association of the salt and the price of salt increased by 3 times.  
 
In the 70s and 80s the people started to worry about water because it started 
disappearing. So, the government came and in the early 80s they said that you need 
to move from here because you don't have a sewerage system and you are living on 
top of an aquifer. But that never happened. When Israel decided to take in all the 
Druze people, the govt. of Jordan decided to cancel its plan of making them move 
and instead drew a line beyond which we could not live (Druze farmer, Azraq, 
21/07/2016). 
 
Unlike the large farmers, many of the small farmers had been farmers—agro-pastoralists—
for generations. Their view of the globalized export-led agricultural development in the 
highlands was jaundiced by their perceptions of their own marginalization in the process 
and their suspicions of the colonial West. For pastoralists particularly, the very notion that a 
historically pastoral society like highland communities should be undercut by international 
meat imports seemed incomprehensible and offensive, e.g., as per a pastoralist: 
 
We will stop in 5 years because it is expensive to raise cattle and the price is not good 
enough. Olive trees are the biggest threat. The government is spreading out olive 
trees everywhere where there used to be pastures for the cattle. So now we don't 
have pasture for our cattle. The British gave them the idea to do that, and now it will 
be over for us soon. They all depend on imported meat in this country and it tastes 
awful (Pastoralist, Ramtha, 17/06/2016). 
 
Whether the British gave the farmers ideas about planting olives is beside the (present) 
point. It is well known that olive plantation is one of the main ways of improving agricultural 
land values (Humpal et al. 2012). However, the perception of marginalization—and viewing 
that marginalization through the lens of Jordan’s colonial history and its continued 
relevance to their lives—is significant as it cuts against the state’s envisioned 
territorialisation through agricultural practice. 
 
Indeed, to the interviewee farmers, the history of colonialism and its linkages to their 
present predicament was an ever-present theme. 
 
Farming is the original profession of most of the people here. Our fathers and 
grandfathers used to practice it. Previously we used to grow barley and wheat but in 
the last 40 years olive tree came to the area with British and American support. But 
this is a political ploy on part of the British, because it makes the country dependent 
upon America and Britain for the wheat. 
 
I own 25 dunum and all my brothers work in farming and the other two brothers 
have 25 dunum. Each works by himself. I have cows and cattle and my brother has 
Doves. I also have bananas here. Only olive is the plant we crop. We stopped wheat 
and barley for 20 years. The govt. brought us olive and gave us money to plant. Most 
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of agriculture is rain fed. Every week we buy water. 10-12 cubic meters, for the cows, 
the cattle and the house needs (Olive farmer near Ramtha, 17/06/2016). 
 
It would be beyond the scope of this article for us to argue that olives have produced a neo-
colonial wheat dependency in Jordan. But certainly, the British Legation in Amman was 
discussing imports of U.S. wheat in the early 1950s and so we can say that calculations of 
terrain may work against state independence6. But, whatever the case, highland olive 
plantations are among the greatest drivers of uneconomical/wasteful water practices 
(Humpal et al. 2012) and they continue apace, partially driven by market signals and the 
subsidies on water. 
 
But these practices are also not entirely divorced from the Jordanian state’s 
territorialization-through-agriculture impulse which, we feel, may be illuminated through 
assemblage-based interpretations of geopolitics. Dittmer (2014: 385-386), for example, 
imagines a posthuman geopolitics incorporating nature and animals among other ‘objects’, 
emphasising their interactions. Here, scalar tensions—between fields, cities, states and 
global systems—become less meaningful, blurring the macro and micro in geopolitics. 
Equally, Dittmer (2014: 393) can emphasise possibility spaces, conjoined with affective 
relations, in more abstract topologies. In this paper we have been concerned with the 
materiality of urban and water infrastructure but affective dimensions may be fed in to our 
assemblage. Here, territorialisation proceeds in and through the intersections of the 
biological, material and environmental, not to mention the suspicion and hostility of farmers 
and their perceptions of their own marginalization. 
 
In this paper we have discussed an assemblage produced by linkages between the water 
infrastructure, the marketing channels for olives, fruits and vegetables and the domestic 
and international flows of agricultural products such as wheat and meat. Affectively, smaller 
Jordanian farmers are deeply suspicious of the state and its apparent subservience to 
Western geopolitical and commercial interests. The state’s territorialisation in the 
topological register as per Allen (2011) may be to recast the Jordanian state as an integrated 
entity within the global flows of capital.  
 
But such topological-style insights are not followed through or exploited for what 
they tell us about how the political demands of ‘distant powers’ are established at a 
distance through a mix of distanciated and proximate actions. Sovereignty may 
require the performance of clearly bounded territories, but that does not mean that 
such territories enclose all the political relationships which produce them or simply 
extend themselves to bridge the gap between ‘here and there’ (p. 247). 
The smaller farmers and pastoralists imaginary and practices are deeply hostile to what they 
perceive to be deterritorialization and then reterritorialization in a globalization mode. They 
do bridge the gap between ‘here and there’ in their understanding and experience of 
highland agriculture in Jordan. The specific place based ecological memories or livelihood, 
and agricultural practices based upon planting wheat and barley and animal husbandry, 
                                                     
6 Interest in the railway alignment for a road to Aqaba; prospects of arrival of American wheat via Beirut; no 
contribution from British defence funds for development of the road from Ma'an to Amman, NA, FO 
371/98878 (1952). 
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hearken to a different mode of localised territorialisation. In this localized notion of 
territory, it is a container of memory, ecology and livelihood, that is the basis for dignity and 




In this paper we have suggested the relevance of water to a Jordanian territory-process 
beginning in the second half of the twentieth century. The production of property and 
strategic relations, the operation of international and domestic law, and the advancement 
of techniques (specifically in agriculture and irrigation) have produced territory in a vein 
consonant with Elden’s (esp. 2010a) work. Our discussion involves the interpretation of 
territory as a phenomenon and the state as the continual improvisations of a series of 
actors besides centralised authorities invested in the waterscape. However, territory is not 
only topography and, as opposed to sovereign or biopolitical perspectives (Alatout 2006), 
our account has emphasised the networked, topological operation of power. 
 
An assemblage, like the Jordan waterscape, is produced through the relational ontologies 
and topological spatialisations which pull together its biospheric, material, environmental 
and social components. The waterscape unfolds through its topological space drawing in 
international donors, flows of capital, state and legal practice, and Jordan’s various rural and 
urban populations. The waterscape’s social relations are embedded in crops, infrastructure, 
developmental ambitions and in no small measure within the cultural identity markers 
invested in land and agriculture. Recognizing the pipes, wells, marketing networks (etc.) 
underlying the Jordanian waterscape as not simply coincidental formations of e.g. 
infrastructure but as assemblage helps us understand the relationality and spatiality of a 
hegemonic form of cross-scalar politics. This is an outcome contingent upon the interests of 
private capital, international donor funding, and state and deep-state power to which the 
fortunes of local water managers are inevitably and unfortunately shackled. 
 
Jordanian water managers have hitched their fate to the Dead Sea-Red Sea Conveyer, which 
will bring desalinated water to Jordan (Hussein 2018b, Bonn 2013). It is an enormously 
expensive infrastructure project, that the Jordanians have an expectation of getting 
financed. Paradoxically the same geopolitical imperatives that prevent Jordanian state from 
taking tough political decisions with regard to highland agriculture, are the ones that they 
suspect will induce the international donors to finance the US $12 billion project, i.e., 
keeping Jordan stable, mostly for Israel’s benefit (see Hussein 2017).7 Therefore, the 
urgency of reform highlighted by international donors is simply not shared by the 
Jordanians, just as Jordan’s project of hydro-social territorialisation is not understood, or 
engaged with by the international donors. 
 
The variegated territorially inflected story we tell of Jordan’s waterscapes should be 
instructive for any initiatives at water sector reforms in Jordan. Jordanian water managers 
more than any Western hydrologists, agronomists or policy experts are mindful of the 
rational choices that they are faced with in highland agriculture. One hydro-economic model 
                                                     
7 Regional geopolitics was urgently and eerily present in conversations with interviews. Many interviews in the 
Mafraq/Ramtha region in northern Jordan were frequently interrupted by the earth-shaking sounds of aerial 
bombing just across the border in Syria.  
 19 
after another has highlighted for them the need for stricter regulation of groundwater 
pumping in the highlands. But few international water experts are willing to engage with the 
political imperatives and constraints that drive Jordanian water management, or a 
substantial lack thereof, in the highlands. Hopefully, our argument for reading the highland 
irrigated agriculture as an exercise in hydro-social territorialisation highlights the need to 
engage with the question of water in Jordan in relation to the vexing, but equally important 
politics of water. The analyses and insights offered here can be a starting point for a more 
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